Prosecuting Pregnant Women: Should Washington
Take the Next Step?
Amanda E. Vedrich*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 16, 1996, in Racine, Wisconsin, Meagan Zimmerman
was born with nearly a .20 blood alcohol level.' Her mother, Deborah
Zimmerman, arrived at the hospital drunk and screaming: "If you
don't keep me here, I'm just going to go home and keep drinking and
drink myself to death and I'm going to kill this thing because I don't
want it anyways." '2 She was eight and one-half months pregnant. A
few hours later she gave birth to Meagan by Cesarean section. Meagan
now suffers from symptoms of fetal alcohol syndrome.3
On June 10, 1996, Deborah Zimmerman was charged with
attempted first degree intentional homicide for her actions prior to
Meagan's birth,4 the first known prosecution for such actions in the
United States.' Meagan now lives in a foster home, while her mother
fights both to defeat the charges brought against her and to gain
custody of the child she tried to kill. 6
This case brings to the forefront the issue of punishing pregnant
women for intentional harm inflicted upon their fetuses. The issue
raises many important policy and legal concerns, including: constitutional rights, the duty of the state to both the mother and the unborn
child, the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent, the effectiveness
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1. See Edward Walsh, In Case Against Alcoholic Mother, Underlying Issue is Fetal Rights:
Attempted Murder Charge Presents "Minefield" of Legal Questions, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 7,
1996, at A4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Summons and Complaint, State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-F-368 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed
June 10, 1996) [hereinafter Summons and Complaint].

6. See Walsh, supra note 1, at A4.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 21:133

of other measures as deterrents, and, most important, the legal

authority to punish women through criminal charges.
Wisconsin authorities believe that they can charge pregnant
women for harm intentionally inflicted upon unborn fetuses within the
confines of the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution,
and applicable statutes and case law.7 The prosecution argues that

Wisconsin cases support this position because the definition of a
homicide includes the death of a fetus from injuries inflicted upon the
pregnant mother.' Therefore, the prosecution argues, it is a natural
extension to allow the prosecution of a pregnant woman for harm she
intentionally inflicted upon her fetus.'
In contrast, current Washington law probably would not allow
such a prosecution."0 However, numerous policy reasons support
recognition of such charges in Washington. These reasons include
Washington's acknowledgment of an affirmative duty toward a viable
fetus, the need to deter mothers from harming unborn children carried
to term, and the necessity to hold a mother accountable should she
intentionally harm her unborn child." Therefore, Washington should
change its criminal laws to permit prosecution of a Zimmerman case.
The first section of this Comment will analyze the case against
Deborah Zimmerman and the court's reasons for refusing to dismiss
the charges against her. The second section will examine current
Washington law and why similar charges could not be brought in this
state. The third section will look at the policy rationales for changing
Washington law to allow charges to be filed against women for
attempting to intentionally endanger the life of a viable fetus. This
Comment argues that Washington law should be so amended in order
to achieve these policy goals.

7. See State's Memorandum of Law in Support of State of Wisconsin's Criminal Complaint,
State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF-525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 10, 1996) [hereinafter State's
Memorandum].
8. See id. at 3 (citing State v. Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)). See also
discussion infra notes 16-19, 38-44, 62-63, 92-94 and accompanying text.
9. See State's Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3.
10. See State v. Dunn, 82 Wash. App. 122, 128-129, 916 P.2d 952, 955-956 (1996) (holding
mother could not be charged with second-degree criminal mistreatment of a child for continuing
to ingest cocaine while pregnant because fetus was not within the statutory definition of a child).
11. See discussion infra section IV.
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II.

STATE OF WISCONSIN V. DEBORAH

A.

J.

ZIMMERMAN

The Criminal Charges

On June 10, 1996, Deborah Zimmerman became the first woman
in the United States charged with attempted first degree intentional
homicide for harm inflicted upon her unborn child. 2 The complaint
states that the defendant did "unlawfully, intentionally, and feloniously, attempt to cause the death of another human being with intent to
kill that person ....Following a July 3, 1996 preliminary hearing, the criminal
complaint was supplemented by a memorandum of law that emphasized that the case did not implicate abortion rights because Meagan
was considered a "person" protected by the United States Constitution
because she was born alive.' 4 However, the State conceded that "had
M.M.Z. been stillborn due to the alcohol intoxication, an argument
may have been made that the defendant successfully aborted a viable
fetus and could not be prosecuted ....,

The prosecution additionally argued "[t]he law in Wisconsin...
is well established that the death of an infant from fetal injuries
constitutes homicide.' 1 6 It cited State v. Cornelius, a 1989 Wisconsin
case which applied the "born alive" rule to determine when an alleged

12. See Summons and Complaint, supra note 5, at 1. The statute reads in part:
"[W]hoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another
is guilty of a Class A felony." WIS. STAT. §940.01(1) (1996).
Attempt is statutorily defined:
An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor have an intent to perform acts and
attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime and that the actor
does acts toward the commission of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under
all the circumstances, that the actor formed that intent and would commit the crime
except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor.
WIS. STAT. § 939.32(3) (1996).
13. Summons and Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.
The Complaint also reads:
As a result of Deborah Zimmerman's prenatal alcohol abuse, Meagan Zimmerman
[M.M.Z.] was born suffering fetal alcohol effects including: Mild Dysmorphic features
consistent with fetal alcohol effect.... Deborah Zimmerman has stated she was aware
that alcohol consumption could lead to birth defects. Ms. Zimmerman was repeatedly
warned by family and health care personnel of the risks of alcohol consumption while
pregnant and ignored all warnings and on March 16, 1996, attempted to kill the unborn
child through alcohol toxicity, knowing that the child's condition was deteriorating over
time. A Cesarean section was necessary because of fetal intolerance to labor and
suspected intra-uterine growth retardation.
14. State's Memorandum, supra note 7 at 3.
15. Id.at 3.
16. Id.(citing Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 435-36).
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victim becomes a separate being for the purpose of a homicide
prosecution.17 Under the born alive rule, a fetus becomes a separate
being for purposes of homicide the instant it is born alive."8 In
Cornelius,the infant died two days after birth from injuries suffered in
utero when the car driven by his intoxicated father left the road and
struck a telephone pole, severely injuring both the driver and the
child's mother.19 The court held that the father could be prosecuted
for the death of his infant.2"
In Deborah Zimmerman's case, the State also emphasized the
logical absurdity that would occur if Zimmerman could not be
prosecuted for attempting to drink her fetus to death when a third
party who provided a pregnant woman with alcohol could be charged
with feticide if the child were born alive, but died later as a result of
alcohol toxicity.21 This hypothetical argument emphasized the irony
in statutes that allow only for prosecution of third parties who
intentionally cause harm to a fetus and not a mother who does the
same thing.
The prosecution further argued that Zimmerman's words and
actions showed an intent to kill the baby and that "it should be left to
a jury to determine if the defendant's conduct fits the statute."22 The
prosecution asserted that Zimmerman did not have an unlimited right
to do what she pleased to her viable fetus.23 Under Roe v. Wade,
once a fetus is viable, the state's interest in the potentiality of human
life is compelling and the state may regulate or prohibit abortions, so
long as the health of the woman is not in jeopardy.24 Therefore,
because Deborah Zimmerman's child was viable, the State had a right
to regulate the mother's behavior by prosecuting her for harmful acts
done to her child.
The State's policy arguments demonstrated that the charges were
not based on Zimmerman's reproductive rights, but on the "child's
quality of life, her health and well-being, and the State's interests in
assuring the right of every child to be free of life-threatening injuries,
toxins and conduct once the child is viable."2 The State concluded

17. Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 437.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 435.

20. See id.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See State's Memorandum, supra note 7,at 5-6; Wis. STAT. § 940.04 (1996).
State's Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3.
See id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
State's Memorandum, supra note 7, at 5.
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that the law must evolve with science and technology by being fluid
enough to address advances in medicine and technology:26 "In an era
where thousands of women give birth to cocaine and alcohol addicted
babies, accountability must attach to those reprehensible acts of the
mother or all of society, as well as the child, shall suffer the permanent
irreparable harm done.""
On August 13, 1996, the defense moved to dismiss the criminal
complaint.2 The defense put forth three major arguments to support
dismissal of the charge of attempted first degree intentional homicide.2 9
First, the defense argued that the State charged Zimmerman with
a noncrime because a woman who kills her unborn child commits no
crime. 30 Because the defendant could not have been charged with a
crime if she had succeeded in killing the fetus before it was born, the
charges must be dismissed. 3' The defense argued a point already
conceded by the State, that had the child been stillborn, Zimmerman
could argue that she successfully aborted a viable fetus,32thereby placing
her under the protection of Wisconsin abortion laws.
Second, the defense argued that the victim of this alleged offense
was not a human being at the time it occurred. 33 The literal definition of human being includes only currently living people, not viable

26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Criminal Complaint, State v. Zimmerman,
No. 96-CF-525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 10, 1996).
The motion reads in part:
[T]he defendant asserts that:
1. as to Count 1: the alleged victim, the then-unborn child M.M.Z., was not a
"human being" as defined by Wis. Stats. Section 939.22(16);
2. as to Count 2: there is no allegation that the alleged victim suffered "great
bodily harm" as defined in Wis. Stats. Section 939.22(4); and

3. no statute nor caselaw in Wisconsin allows the State to criminally charge a

pregnant woman for any action taken against her fetus.
WIS. STAT. § 939.22(16) defines a human being as "one who has been born alive." See also Brief
in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information for Failure of the State to Adduce
Probable Cause at the Preliminary Hearing, State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF-525 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
filed June 10, 1996) [hereinafter Defendant's Brief].
29. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 3.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 4. Had the defendant succeeded in killing the fetus, she would have been
exempt from prosecution under Wisconsin abortion statutes. See Wis. STAT. §§ 940.04, 940.13,
and 940.15 (1996).
32. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 4; State's Memorandum, supa note 7, at 3.
33. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 4.

Seattle University Law Review
fetuses.3 4

[Vol. 21:133

Therefore, the State should be unable to prosecute a

pregnant woman for the death of her viable fetus.3"
Finally, the defense claimed insufficient evidence existed to sustain
a finding of probable cause on all elements of the crime.36 The
defense argued that the State had not put forth sufficient evidence to
prove its prima facie case.37

The defense, like the prosecution, offered a review of current
Wisconsin case law.38 The defense first attempted to distinguish
State v. Cornelius, which the prosecution offered as support. 39 The
defense emphasized that Cornelius did not address the fetus' rights as
opposed to those of the mother.40 It further argued that Cornelius was
inapplicable because the Zimmerman case juxtaposed the rights of the
mother against the rights of the fetus, an important issue that Cornelius
did not address. 4
The defense also distinguished Cornelius by
pointing out that the time frame is different for homicide versus
attempted homicide because a homicide cannot be completed until
someone dies.42 In Cornelius, the child died after it was born alive,
thus making the homicide statute applicable. 43 However, in Zimmerman's case, the alleged act of attempted homicide was completed at a
time when the fetus arguably was not a human being, thus making the
attempted homicide statute inapplicable.44
The defense additionally cited State v. Black and State ex rel.
Angela M. W v. Kruzicki, two cases not originally offered as support
by the State.4" The defense argued that Black further supported the
notion that a mother could not be charged for causing the death of her
unborn child.4 6 In Black, the defendant-father was charged with the
crime of "feticide" for causing the death of his viable unborn child by
violently assaulting the unborn child's mother five days before the
expected date of birth.47 The statute under which Black was charged

34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 4.
39. Id. at 5; Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 434.
40. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 4; Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 434.
41. See id.
42. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 5-6; Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 434.
43. Cornelius, 448 N.W.2d at 434.
44. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 5-6; WIS. STAT. § 939.32 (1996).
45. State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1994); State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki,
541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
46. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 6.
47. Black, 526 N.W.2d at 132.
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specifically exempted the mother of the fetus from prosecution which,
according to the Zimmerman defense, further demonstrated the
legislative intent that a mother should not be charged for harming her
48
fetus.
In Kruzicki, the court upheld the detention and protective
placement of a viable fetus and hence its mother.49 In this case,
Angela M.W.'s obstetrician suspected that she was using cocaine, a
suspicion later proved correct by blood tests.50 The doctor suggested
that Angela seek treatment, but she refused."1 The doctor then
reported this to the Department of Health and Human Services, which
ordered the viable fetus to be taken into protective custody. 52 This
order, in effect, forced Angela to go to the hospital for inpatient drug
treatment.53 The Zimmerman defense argued that in Kruzicki the
court dealt not with criminal charges, but with the appropriateness of
detention of a pregnant woman using drugs in order to protect the
child under the Children's Code, 54which was far from endorsing
criminal charges against the mother.
Finally, the Zimmerman defense argued that the closest precedent
in Wisconsin case law was Vandervelden v. Victoria.5 In Vandervelden, a child attempted to sue a doctor for injuries received during an
unsuccessful abortion to which the mother had consented.5 6 The
defense alleged that Vandervelden was closely related to the Zimmerman case since it was the only case in Wisconsin that dealt with
actions by the mother.57 The Vandervelden court cited Roe v. Wade
for the proposition that a "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn and held that to allow a battery
action against the doctor could create a right not in existence in
Wisconsin law.5"

48. See id.; see WIS. STAT. § 940.04 (1996).
49. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d at 482.
50. See id.

51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d at 482; Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 6. The Children's
Code, WIS. STAT. ch. 48, represents a proper and tailored means by which the state of Wisconsin
may exercise its compelling state interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of a viable

fetus.
55. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 6; Vandervelden v. Victoria, 502 N.W.2d 276
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
56. Vandervelden, 502 N.W.2d at 277.
57. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 6.
58. Vandervelden, 502 N.W.2d at 279-280. But see supranotes 19 and 20 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the Zimmerman defense relied mainly on the lack of
precedent for charges against pregnant women, as well as on the
statutory argument that a fetus is not considered a human being under
Wisconsin law. 9
The prosecution responded to the defense's arguments by reemphasizing many of the points in its original brief.60 First, it
emphasized that this was not an abortion case; therefore, Zimmerman
could not be given the broad protections from prosecution allowed in
the abortion statutes.61
Second, the prosecution cited Cornelius to establish that in
Wisconsin, through the use of the "born alive" rule, the death of an
infant from fetal injuries constitutes a homicide.62 The State emphaexisted for
sized this case to support its contention that precedent
63
prosecuting someone for the death of a viable fetus.
Finally, the prosecution again discussed Roe v. Wade and how the
Roe Court balanced a mother's interests against those of her unborn
child.64 Under Roe, during the third trimester of pregnancy, the state
has a 65clear and recognized interest in the potential life of the viable
fetus.
The prosecution also countered many of the arguments offered by
the defense. It factually distinguished Vandervelden because that case
involved a less than three-month-old nonviable fetus, as opposed to
Zimmerman's nearly full-term, viable fetus.66 The prosecution also
emphasized the timing of Zimmerman's acts. Her words and actions
showed an intent to kill the baby, whether before or after birth.67
Voluntary intoxication should not be a defense because Zimmerman
knew her actions threatened the life of her unborn child.6 8 Had
Zimmerman killed her child thirty seconds after its birth, there would
be no question as to the validity of the charges.69

59. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 28, at 6.
60. See State of Wisconsin's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Information for Failure of the State to Adduce Probable Cause at the Preliminary Hearing, State
v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF-525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 10, 1996) [hereinafter State's Response];
State's Memorandum, supra note 7.
61. See State's Response, supra note 60, at 3.
62. See id.

63. See id.
64. See id.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159, 163 (1973); State's Response, supra note 60, at 5.
See State's Response, supra note 60, at 6; Vandervelden, 502 N.W.2d at 276.
See State's Response, supra note 60, at 4.
See id.
See id.
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Finally, the prosecution argued the applicability of the recent
South Carolina Supreme Court decision in Whitner v. State of South
7" In Whitner, a mother pled guilty to criminal child neglect
Carolina.
for using cocaine throughout her pregnancy thus causing her baby to
be born addicted to cocaine. 71 The court held that a viable fetus is
a person for purposes of the Child Abuse and Endangerment Statute. 72 The court said:
[We do not see any rational basis for finding a viable fetus is not
a "person" in the present context. Indeed, it would be absurd to
recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of homicide laws
and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes
We do not believe that the plain and
proscribing child abuse ....
ordinary meaning of the word "person" has changed in any way that
would now deny viable fetuses status as persons. 73
The Zimmerman prosecution urged the court to adopt the
reasoning of the South Carolina court and allow the charges against
Deborah Zimmerman for first degree attempted homicide to stand.74
B.

The Judge's Decision

On September 18, 1996, Judge Dennis J. Barry ruled that
sufficient probable cause did exist to allow the charges to stand. 7' He
emphasized that the decision turned upon the unique set of facts as
viewed under the existing laws of Wisconsin.76
77
Judge Barry first decided that this was not an abortion case:
"The massive consumption of alcohol by a mother when her pregnancy
has virtually reached full term hardly qualifies as an abortion attempt
under any reasonable or common sense view."'78 Judge Barry found
that the fetus in this case was both viable and full term,79 noting that
[a]lthough this is not an abortion case, the term "viability" is
defined in the Wisconsin abortion statute, WIS. STAT. § 940.15(1),

70. Whitner v. State of South Carolina, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120 (S.C. July 15,
1996).
71. Id. at 3.

72. See id. at 1.
73. Id. at 9.
74. See State's Response, supra note 60, at 6.

75. See Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 10, 1996) [hereinafter Decision].
76.. See Decision, supra note 75, at 15.
77. See id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. See id.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 21:133

as "that stage of fetal development when, in the medical judgment
of the attending physician based on the particular facts of the case
before him or her, there is reasonable likelihood of sustained survival
of the fetus outside the womb, with or without artificial support."
This appears to be a standard medical and legal definition."
The court concluded that because this was not an abortion case "it
removes the defendant from the sweeping abortion protections made
81
available to a pregnant woman ....
Judge Barry then found that the defense's reliance on a strict
reading of the definition of "human being" as "one who has been born
alive" was misplaced for several reasons.82 First, Judge Barry noted
that the fetus was indeed born alive within hours of the defendant's
conduct.8 3 Second,
the proximity in time of the alcohol consumption by the defendant
to when the child was born is highly determinative in this case.
The child was born while the destructive effects of the defendant's
massive consumption of alcohol were still ongoing. At the time
when the infant became a human being, as Sec. 939.22(16) may
define that term, the defendant's blood alcohol reading was .30
percent and the child's was .199 percent.'
Third, the effects of the alcohol remained strong when the baby
was born.85

The defendant's attempt to take her baby's life was set into motion
by her intentional consumption of huge amounts of alcoholic
beverages and remained operative as long as the dangerous level of

alcohol stayed in her system and that of her full-term fetus. While
the effects of her conduct were still in motion, the baby was
born.

86

Thus, "[t]he convergence in time of the instrumentality of murder
(alcohol) with the victim being born was not instantaneous such as
when a bullet is fired from a gun toward a human target. Nevertheless, the convergence occurred and the elements of the crime have been
established for probable cause purposes. "87

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 5, n.1.
Decision, supra note 75, at 5-6.
Id. at 6; WIS. STAT. § 939.22(16) (1996).
See Decision, supra note 75, at 7.
Id.

85. See id.
86. Id. at 7-8.
87. Id. at 8.
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Judge Barry then concluded that in the Zimmerman case "the
facts are a natural extension of State v. Cornelius,"88 despite the fact
that the Cornelius court had no need to compare the fetus' rights with
the mother's.89 In Cornelius, the father was convicted of homicide for
harm inflicted upon the fetus; in the Zimmerman case, the mother's
90
actions, instead of the father's, caused the harm to the viable fetus.
Judge Barry also noted that "providing protective status to a
For example, in
viable fetus has precedence in Wisconsin. '"91
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., a woman in her eighth
month of pregnancy claimed injuries suffered during a car accident
caused her child to be stillborn.92 The Kwaterski court held that a
viable fetus was a person within the meaning of Wisconsin's wrongful
death statute and that the fetus was therefore entitled to the protection
of tort law.93 Thus, Judge Barry concluded that "there are circumstances in Wisconsin law when a viable fetus has rights in relation to
certain conduct which is adverse to it, even as it relates to its moth94
er.")
Judge Barry also distinguished Vandervelden and Black.95
Vandervelden did not apply because it involved a nonviable fetus and
the Zimmerman case had nothing to do with an abortion. 96 Black did
not apply because it involved the prosecution of a defendant-father
under a statute entitled "abortion. '97 Judge Barry concluded that
"nothing in these or other Wisconsin cases which have been cited can
be viewed as inconsistent or contrary to the conclusions reached in this
decision."98
Responding to other defense arguments, Judge Barry rejected a
due process claim for lack of notice,99 because "people who kill or
harm others because of excessive use of alcohol are well known in our
society to suffer criminal consequences for their actions."100 He also
found that parents are not immune from criminal charges when the

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967).
See Decision, supra note 75, at 12-13; Kwaterski, 148 N.W.2d at 110.
Decision, supra note 75, at 13.
See id. at 14-15.
See id.
See id. at 15.

Id.
See id. at 10-11.
Id. at 10.
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persons harmed are their children and that the defendant "cannot be
deemed ignorant" of either of these facts.1"'
Judge Barry concluded that Wisconsin law was sufficient to
10 2
support the charges brought against Zimmerman.
The State has persuasively argued that the defendant certainly would
be prosecuted if she had caused her child to drink vodka from a
baby bottle upon leaving the hospital. She would also be prosecuted
if she killed her infant by running off the road while driving with a
.30 percent blood alcohol reading. Why then should she not be
held accountable for her acts in this case? Society holds people
accountable for harm they cause others while intoxicated. Clearly
the defendant knew this."0 3
Judge Barry emphasized that this ruling was only a denial of the
defendant's motion to dismiss: guilt or innocence would be decided at
04
trial.1
Judge Barry ended his opinion with a plea to the legislature to
"clarify to what extent a viable fetus may be protected," ' by clearly
defining the recognized state's interest in potential human life,
something that has not been done in the twenty-three years since Roe
06
v. Wade.1
[W]hat happens when a woman chooses to ignore the information
and continue to consume substantial quantities of alcohol and drugs
throughout her entire pregnancy? Should society be forced to sit
back, shrug its shoulders and pay for all the long-term medical and
social costs associated with that irresponsible behavior? Others who
endanger life by acting under the influence of alcohol or drugs are
held accountable for their behavior, including parents who jeopardize the safety of their children. Why should a woman carrying a
viable fetus escape responsibility for intentional or reckless acts? It
seems that the next logical step for the legislature following its
[substantial changes in the Children's Code] is for it to create a clear
statement as to what extent viable fetuses can be protected." 7

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
See id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
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Since the Wisconsin court denied the defendant's motion, the
defense has appealed.' 08

III.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF WASHINGTON LAW

Had Deborah Zimmerman lived in Washington state, she
probably could not have been charged under existing Washington law.
As it currently stands, no woman has been convicted in Washington
for harm inflicted upon her own fetus. 1' 9 In Washington, both
statutory and case law allow for criminal prosecution and civil actions
against third parties who cause the death of a viable fetus, but in all
contexts exclude the mother from liability or prosecution.
Washington case law allows individuals to be held civilly liable for
killing a viable fetus by harming the pregnant woman under the

wrongful-death statute.11° Washington criminal statutes allow a third
party to be charged with first degree manslaughter for inflicting harm
upon a pregnant woman which kills her viable fetus, but the language
of the statutes excludes the mother from prosecution.111 In the only
case in Washington that involved prosecution of a pregnant woman for
harming her viable fetus, the court held that a viable fetus was not
within the criminal definition of a person unless specifically includ-

ed.'

12

Washington law has three civil causes of action under which
parents may sue for the tortious death of a child: wrongful death, the
survival action, and the parental claim for death of a child. Under
wrongful death, an individual who kills a viable fetus by harming the
pregnant woman can be civilly liable." 3 Courts have construed the
14
underlying statutes liberally because they are remedial in nature.
The only prerequisite to maintaining a survival action under any of

108. See Order for Stay of Proceedings Pending Appeal, State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 10, 1996); Petition for Leave to Appeal a Non-Final Order Entered
in Circuit Court, Racine County, Honorable Dennis J. Barry Presiding, Denying Motion to
Dismiss Information for Failure of the State to Adduce Probable Cause at the Preliminary
Hearing, State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF-525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed June 10, 1996).
109. See Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 122, 916 P.2d at 952 (holding mother could not be
charged with second-degree criminal mistreatment of a child for ingesting cocaine while pregnant).
110. See Cavazos v. Franklin, 73 Wash. App. 116, 867 P.2d 674 (1994); WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
111. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060 (1996).
112. See Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 128-129, 916 P.2d at 955.
113. See WASH. REv. CODE §§4.20.010, 4.20.046, 4.24.010 (1996).
114. See Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 324, 378 P.2d 413, 415 (1963).
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these statutes is that the decedent could have maintained the action had
he or she lived."'
Courts have extended civil liability to include fetal death and
injury. In Seattle-First National Bank v. Rankin, the court held that
a fetus that is injured before birth by the negligence of another may
recover damages for the injury if it lives after birth."' The court
reasoned that allowing
recovery for injuries suffered before birth is the
"more just rule.""' 7 In Moen v. Hanson, the court concluded that the
term "minor child" as used in the parental claim for the wrongful
death of a minor child statute included a viable fetus never born
alive."8 The court viewed the use of the term "minor" as indicating
when the rights of the parents ended (i.e., at majority), not when they
began. 119 The court did recognize the inherent causation difficulties
which would be created by allowing this cause of action, but determined that this reason was insufficient to deny recovery. 20 Thus,
the civil law of Washington recognizes viable fetuses as human beings
with value and deserving of legal protection.
Washington criminal law has also recognized that in certain
circumstances the death of a viable fetus is a crime. First degree
manslaughter is defined at title 9A,section 32.060 of the Washington
Revised Code. The statute states:
(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
(a) he recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) he intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child

by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child.
(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.'
Section (1)(b) of this statute states that a person can be charged with
first degree manslaughter for harming a mother and therefore killing
her viable fetus. However, the statute has not been extended to cover
charging the mother for inflicting injury upon herself and her fetus. 22

115.
116.
117.
118.
(1996).
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Cavazos, 73 Wash. App. at 119, 867 P.2d at 676.
59 Wash. 2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 837-838 (1962).

Id.
85 Wash. 2d 597, 599, 537 P.2d 266, 267 (1975); see WASH. REV. CODE 4.24.010
Moen, 85 Wash. 2d at 599, 537 P.2d at 267.
See id. at 601, 537 P.2d at 267-268.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060 (1996) (emphasis added).
In fact, the statute has never been used to charge a pregnant woman for killing her

viable fetus.
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In 1994, when Timothy Blackwell shot and killed his wife (who
was eight months pregnant), her fetus, and her friend, the King
County prosecutor charged him under this statute." 3 In 1995,
Blackwell was convicted of first degree manslaughter for killing his
wife's viable fetus." 4 Before the Blackwell case, title 9A, § 32.060,
had been most frequently used for prosecuting defendants for abortions
when abortion was still illegal in this state.2 The Blackwell decision
indicated an emerging need for punishment of individuals for
wrongfully harming a viable fetus outside of the context of abortions.
Since then, the State brought charges of second degree criminal
mistreatment of a child against a mother for ingesting cocaine while
pregnant. Immediately after the birth of her child, the mother and
newborn child both tested positive for cocaine. 126 The mother
admitted to using cocaine during her pregnancy. 127 During a prenatal consultation months before the birth, the doctor had warned that
continuing to use cocaine could damage her child. 12 The doctor
scheduled Dunn to begin a drug treatment program during her
pregnancy, but Dunn never attended the program. 29 Due to the
mother's continued cocaine use, the child was born with fetal intrauterine growth retardation and placenta abruptio, two life-threatening
conditions. ° The State then charged the mother with second degree
criminal mistreatment of her viable unborn child.'
Prosecutors
alleged that the mother "did recklessly create an imminent and
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm by taking cocaine during
pregnancy after being warned by the doctor that it was harmful to the
unborn child."'13 2 However, the trial court granted the mother's
motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case of
guilt.

13 3

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 134 The court held
that the State failed to establish that a rational trier of fact could have

123.
124.
125.
Wash. 2d
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See State v. Blackwel, No. 95-1-0376-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1995).
See id.
See, e.g., State v. Unosawa, 48 Wash. 2d 616, 296 P.2d 315 (1956); State v. Hart, 26
776, 175 P.2d 944 (1946).
See Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 123, 916 P.2d at 953.
See id.
See id. at 122, 916 P.2d at 953.
See id. at 124, 916 P.2d at 953.
See id.
See id. at 123, 916 P.2d at 953; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.030(1)(a) (1996).
Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 125, 916 P.2d at 953.
See id.
See id. at 124, 916 P.2d at 953.
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found beyond a reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime had
been established. 135 Five elements must be proven to establish
second degree criminal mistreatment: (1) the defendant must be a
parent or guardian; (2) the victim must be a child or dependent; (3) the
defendant must act recklessly; (4) the defendant's actions must create
an imminent and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm; and (5)
the risk of death or harm must be caused by withholding a basic
necessity of life. 136 The court held that the State failed to definitively
prove two essential elements: (1) that the victim was a child, and (2)
that the mother withheld a basic necessity of life.137
The court first analyzed why an unborn child was not a "child"
138
for the purpose of prosecution for criminal mistreatment of a child.
While noting that a fetus is considered a "minor child" under
Washington law for the purposes of the wrongful death statute, 139 the
court stated that "[n]o Washington criminal case has ever included
'unborn child' or fetus in its definition of person. When the Legislature intends to include the fetus in a class of criminal victims, it
specifically writes that language into the statute."' 40 Furthermore,
the court stated that the Legislature's failure to specifically define
"child" to include a fetus indicated its intention not to depart from
typical definition of child in criminal statutes as person from birth to
age 18.41 The court also noted that the Legislature intended for the
statute to apply only when the mother withheld a "basic necessity of
'
of life to
Rather, the Legislature intended basic necessities
life."142
143
include only food, shelter, clothing, and health care.
No current Washington statute defines the State's interest in
potential human life. Dunn shows that charges similar to those
brought against Zimmerman would not stand in Washington because
specific criminal statutory definitions include fetus only when the harm
Therefore, the Legislature must
is inflicted upon the mother. 1"

135. See id. at 127, 916 P.2d at 955.
136. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.030(l)(a) (1996); see also State v. Bartlett, 74 Wash.
App. 580, 593, 875 P.2d 651, 658 (1994).
137. See Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 27, 916 P.2d at 955.
138. Id.
139. See Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 599-600, 537 P.2d 266-67 (1975); WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
140. See Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 128, 916 P.2d at 955 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.32.060(1)(b) (1996)).
141. See Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 128-129, 916 P.2d at 955.
142. Id. at 129, 916 P.2d at 955-956.
143. See id. at 129, 916 P.2d at 955.
144. Id.
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create a statute which would allow the State to charge pregnant women
under the criminal law for intentionally harming a viable fetus.
IV. WHY WASHINGTON LEGISLATORS NEED TO
AMEND STATE LAWS
A.

The Problem

Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE)
are birth defects with life-long consequences and secondary disabilities
caused by prenatal alcohol exposure. When a pregnant woman drinks
alcohol, the alcohol passes through the placenta to the fetus. 14' The
1 46
alcohol then remains in the fetus longer than it does in the mother.
In 1973, researchers from the University of Washington introduced the
term "Fetal Alcohol Syndrome" to describe a pattern of birth defects
they observed in children born to alcoholic mothers.147 Since then,
using alcohol while
more than 2,000 studies have confirmed that
14
pregnant can cause permanent birth defects. 1
FAS is diagnosed when three primary characteristics occur
growth deficiency, a characteristic pattern of physical
together:
abnormalities, and some manifestation of central nervous system
dysfunction. 149 First, "individuals with FAS may exhibit inadequate
growth and development before and/or after birth."'' 0 Second, FAS
is characterized by a unique cluster of minor facial abnormalities.'
The most common facial features associated with FAS include: short
palpebral fissures (small width of the eye opening); flat midface;
smooth philtrum (the vertical ridges between the nose and upper lip
tend to be flat); thin upper lip; low nasal bridge (the bridge of the nose

145. See Janna C. Merrick, MaternalSubstance Abuse During Pregnancy: Policy Implications

inthe United States, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 57, 58 (1993) [hereinafter Merrick, Maternal Substance
Abuse].
146.

See id.

147. See Fetal Alcohol and Drug Unit, University of Washington School of Medicine,
UNDERSTANDING THE OCCURRENCE OF SECONDARY DISABILrrIES IN CLIENTS WITH FETAL
ALCOHOL SYNDROME (FAS) AND FETAL ALCOHOL EFFECTS (FAE) 9 (Final Report 1996)

[hereinafter Understanding].
148. See Comprehensive Health Education Foundation, THE WASHINGTON STATE FETAL
ALCOHOL RESOURCE GUIDE: TOOLS FOR PREVENTION AND INFORMATION iv (1996)

[hereinafter Resource Guide].
149. See Understanding, supra note 147, at 11.
150. Resource Guide, supra note 148, at vii.
151. See id. The presence of one or two facial abnormalities is not sufficient to make the
physical diagnosis.
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skin which
between the eyes tend to be flat); epicanthal folds (folds of
2
occur at the inner corner of the eye); and a short nose.1
Third, "FAS is characterized by cognitive and behavioral
dysfunction due to structural and chemical damage to the brain.
Evidence of damage may be structural, neurological, and/or behavioral."" 3 Structural damage includes microcephaly (small head size)
and damage to specific structures in the brain.1 14 Neurologic damage
includes seizures, abnormalities of muscle tone, tremors or marked
Behavioral
incoordination, hearing problems, and visual problems.'
damage includes attention deficit disorder (with or without hyperactivity), problems with reasoning and judgment (inability to predict
consequences of behavior), speech and language delays, poor memory,
and mild to severe mental retardation."5 6
There is no established "safe" amount for a pregnant woman to
drink because alcohol affects everyone differently."5 7 Two women
may drink the same amount of alcohol during pregnancy and one may
have an affected child and the other may have a "normal" child. 5 8
The degree of effects from prenatal alcohol exposure varies case to case
due to a variety of factors such as timing of the exposure, dose,
frequency, and genetic factors in the mother and/or fetus."5 9 "In
general, the more a woman drinks, the greater the risk[] to the
fetus.'

160

Studies estimate the number of infants born each year with FAS
are between one and three per 1,000 live births. 161 Each year over
40,000 children in the United States are born with defects due to
prenatal alcohol exposure. 162 Preliminary data from a pilot study
conducted in two Washington State counties found 1.9 cases of FAS
per 1,000 first graders.' 63 With approximately 79,000 births per year
in Washington state, between 79 and 237 new cases of FAS occur each
164
year.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154.

See id. at vi.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id.
See id.
See id. at vii.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, PUBLIC HEALTH EDUCATION

INFORMATION SHEET:

DRINKING DURING PREGNANCY (1992).

163. See Resource Guide, supra note 148, at vi.
164. See id.
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FAS is the leading known causes of mental retardation in the
United States. 6 The effects of FAS are permanent. People with
166
FAS have the disabilities they are born with throughout their lives.
Most important, unlike many other birth defects, FAS is preventable.1 67 However, high rates of both alcohol use and unplanned
pregnancies make prevention a difficult task.161 To be effective,
prevention should involve a multifaceted approach including public
education, effective pregnancy planning, and adequate treatment
services for chemically dependent women. 6 9 Unfortunately, these
measures alone are not enough. While negligence is the usual state of
mind under which such alcohol abuse occurs, steps must be taken
which allow at least for the prosecution of pregnant women like
Deborah Zimmerman who drink in an intentional attempt to kill their
viable fetus.
B.

The Solution

By amending the law, Washington could ensure that pregnant
women could not intentionally harm their viable fetuses with impunity.
In order to allow for the prosecution of women like Deborah Zimmerman, Washington legislators should amend title 9A, section 32.060, the
first degree manslaughter statute, to read:
(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
(a) he recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) he intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn viable fetus
by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child, or
(c) a pregnant woman intentionally and unlawfully kills her
unborn viable fetus through the use of drugs and/or alcohol.
(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
By adding section (1)(c), the state could prosecute pregnant
women for drinking in an intentional attempt to kill their viable
fetuses. In addition, this amendment is narrow enough to avoid
unnecessary and unadvised prosecutions.

165. See Children's Trust Foundation, FETAL ALCOHOL FACT SHEET on file at the Seattle

University Law Review.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See
See
See
See

id.
Resource Guide, supra note 148, at i.
id.
id.
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C. Why Arguments Against State Intervention are Insufficient
Opponents make three main arguments against prosecution of
pregnant women for harming their fetuses. First, some argue that laws
allowing for this prosecution create a fetal interest that previously did
not exist. 170 Second, some argue that there are constitutional reasons
for why such laws cannot be passed.17 ' Finally, some argue that
prosecuting pregnant women would deter them from seeking the
prenatal care they need.17 ' This section will demonstrate why none
of these claims is sufficient to argue for a ban on the prosecution of
pregnant women.
1.

Creation of Fetal Interest Argument

The first and most common argument against a statute allowing
the prosecution of the mother is that it would create a fetal interest in
opposition to that of the mother.1 73 Prosecution of the mother would
be a statement that a viable fetus has rights greater than those of the
mother. 171

This argument ignores the fact that by allowing the state to
regulate abortions during the second and third trimesters, Roe v. Wade
17 5
already recognized a state interest protecting potential human life.
This interest was clarified and reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.'76 The Court held that fostering
or protecting the health of a viable fetus was a valid state purpose that
allowed the state to regulate abortions so long as no undue burdens
were imposed upon pregnant women. 177 Therefore, prosecuting
pregnant women for harming their fetuses does not have to create a
fetal interest that forsakes the rights of pregnant women, because Casey

170. See, e.g., Molly McNulty, Comment, PregnancyPolice: The Health, Policy and Legal
Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 277, 280 (1987-1988) (hereinafter McNulty, Pregnancy Police).
171. See, e.g., id. at 310-18.
172. See Merrick, Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 145, at 68.
173. See, e.g., McNulty, Pregnancy Police, supra note 170, at 280.
174. See id.
175. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. It is unclear when the most harm is done to the fetus-when
the mother drinks during pregnancy, during the first trimester, or after that. Because this author
suggests a narrow statute, the problem of the first trimester is extinguished.
176. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 U.S. 2791, 2819
(1992).
177. See id.
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already recognized a protected state interest in preserving potential
has 178
life.
Also, prosecuting pregnant women for harming their fetuses is not
a statement that a fetus has no rights when a woman decides to abort
but has legal person rights when it serves the interest of the state.
Prosecution under the proposed statute could only occur when there is
a viable fetus, the point at which the state already has a recognizable
interest in protecting the potential human life.
Abortion rights advocates also argue that the end goal of
prosecuting pregnant women is to have the fetus achieve equal status
with the woman because it has a constitutionally protected right to life
before birth. 179 This again ignores the fact that the state's interest
in protecting the fetus would only take effect when the fetus becomes
viable, when the state already has the power to regulate abortions.8 0
Allowing states to prosecute pregnant women for harm to fetuses does
not recognize any new rights of a viable fetus, it merely protects
previously recognized rights.
2. Constitutional Argument
A second argument of opponents is that the prosecution of
pregnant women is unconstitutional because of the constitutional
prohibitions on vagueness, illegal interference with a woman's right to
liberty, and equal protection of the law.1 8' The vagueness argument
can be easily countered if the Legislature drafts a statute which is
narrowly tailored towards the goal of deterring women from using
alcohol and drugs while pregnant. The statute should provide that
charges could only be brought against a pregnant woman who acted
intentionally regarding the life of her viable fetus. Through careful
drafting, this proposed statute can be narrowly tailored to avoid the
problem of a "slippery slope." In addition, the legislative history will
indicate that the intent is for the statute to be limited and not to allow
the state to prosecute a pregnant woman for things such as her diet or
lack of exercise.
The argument that a statute would constitute illegal interference
with a woman's protected liberty interest is also ineffective. First, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that a woman does not

178. See id.
179. See Scott Lehigh, Common Sense, or a New Way To Ban Abortion?, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, September 15, 1996, at Di.
180. See Casey, 112 U.S. at 2819.
181. See, e.g., McNulty, Pregnancy Police, supra note 170, at 310-18.
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have a fundamental right to an abortion.1 12 Second, the Court has
held that a state does have a permissible interest in protecting the life
83
of a viable fetus and can do so through the regulation of abortions.1
This establishes that a woman's right to liberty must be balanced
against the state's right to protect potential life. This balancing may
be accomplished through a carefully worded statute that would
prosecute a woman only for recklessly or intentionally endangering the
life of her viable fetus through the use of drugs or alcohol, which
would not be placing an undue burden on the mother." 4
Furthermore, arguing that a statute that criminalizes the behavior
only of women would violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is also ineffective. In Michael M. v. Sonoma County
Superior Court, the Court has held that a law may discriminate on the
In
basis of gender if the differences the law addresses are "real." '
upholding a statutory rape statute aimed at deterring underage
pregnancy that only punished males having intercourse with underage
females, the Supreme Court stated that the fact that only women could
become pregnant was a "real" difference which allowed for disparate
treatment by the law."8 6 This reasoning also applies in prosecuting
pregnant women; when and if men ever gain the ability to become
pregnant, they would become subject to such a law.
Thus, if the Washington Legislature enacted a statute that was
narrowly tailored towards the specific purpose of prohibiting women
from endangering their fetuses by intentionally abusing drugs and
alcohol during their pregnancies, it would probably withstand any level
of constitutional scrutiny.
3.

Deterrence from Prenatal Care Argument

The final argument against prosecuting pregnant women is that
prosecution would not deter women from abusing drugs and alcohol
but instead more women would go without the necessary prenatal care
in order to avoid prosecution.18 7 But enacting a law allowing for
prosecution would not be the sole means used to deter women from
abusing drugs and alcohol during pregnancy. The methods currently
used to deter women from abusing drugs and alcohol during pregnancy, namely voluntary treatment programs and education, have been
182. See Casey, 112 U.S. at 2819.
183. See Casey, 112 U.S. at 2819.
184.

See id.

185. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
186. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 464.
187. See McNulty, Pregnancy Police, supra note 170, at 310-18.
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ineffective.' 8 Advocating a law to prosecute women who intentionally put the life of a viable fetus at risk is not calling for the end of the
education process. In order to be effective, the education process must
be improved. The addition of the criminal statute would be an
attempt to make women more painfully aware of the consequences of
their drinking and drug use during pregnancy. In order to ensure that
pregnant women would not avoid necessary prenatal care, the state
needs to provide for a program in which women can seek help and
guidance during the early stages of their pregnancy.'89 The goal of
the statute is to stop pregnant women from abusing drugs and alcohol
while pregnant, not to put pregnant women in jail.
Under the proposed Washington law, if a woman, much like
Deborah Zimmerman, arrived at a hospital to give birth to an infant
who tested positive for drugs or alcohol, the woman could be charged
with a crime. On the other hand, if the woman sought early prenatal
care that helped her stop abusing drugs and alcohol, she would
certainly avoid any chance of prosecution. To be effective, this law
needs to be accompanied by meaningful access to adequate prenatal
care and drug treatment facilities.
D.

Why Intervention Is the Solution

Currently, Washington state is only one step away from the
prosecution of pregnant women for intentional or reckless disregard for
the life of their unborn children. The Washington case of State v.
Blackwell and the criminal statute under which Blackwell was convicted
for the death of his viable fetus indicate that the state is willing to
recognize the murder of a viable fetus as a crime. 9 ' However, in
State v. Dunn, the court indicated that the plain language of the
" '
statute, when strictly construed, did not include a viable fetus. 19
After all, Washington already recognizes an affirmative duty toward a
viable fetus through the civil liability for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus. 92 Furthermore, the interest of the state in protecting potential
life is also recognized in Roe and Casey.'93
The most important point is the need to protect society, including
both the mother and the child. When the mother chooses to use
alcohol and drugs throughout her pregnancy, she not only endangers
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Children's Trust Foundation, FETAL ALCOHOL FACT SHEET, supra note 165.
See Resource Guide, supra note 148, at i.
Blackwell, No. 95-1-0376-3.
Dunn, 82 Wash. App. at 122, 916 P.2d at 952.
See Moen, 85 Wash. 2d at 599, 537 P.2d at 266.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Casey, 112 U.S. at 2819.
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her own life, but the life of her innocent child. The state needs to
deter mothers from harming their unborn children. Currently,
education and encouraging treatment are the only ways to do this, but
these means have been ineffective.
A critical issue for the judge's decision in the Zimmerman case
was the fact that Deborah Zimmerman acted intentionally-she knew
what she was doing and hoped that she would kill her child.194
Zimmerman had sufficient knowledge of her actions, and the possible
harm that could ensue.195 Women who abuse drugs and alcohol
consistently throughout their pregnancy need to be stopped. Since
statistics show that education and encouraging treatment are ineffective,
Washington state needs to amend its laws to begin prosecuting these
women. 196
While Roe and Casey hold that the constitutional right to privacy
is broad enough to encompass a woman's autonomy over her body
during pregnancy, the law maintains that the right is not absolute and
that the state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding
health and protecting potential life.1 97 Ms. Zimmerman could have
exercised her right to privacy and chosen abortion before her fetus was
viable. But, by choosing to proceed with the pregnancy, she tacitly
accepted the responsibility to act reasonably in regard to Meagan's
health and thus subjected herself to state intervention.
The Washington Legislature as well must act reasonably in
enacting a law to punish women like Zimmerman. The fear that
women will be prosecuted for smoking, jogging, or sipping wine in
their ninth month of pregnancy demonstrates the line that Washington
Legislators should draw: the defendant's intentional disregard for the
life of her unborn child deserves to be punished. In situations like that
of Deborah Zimmerman, the state has a clear duty to proceed with the
prosecution.

V. CONCLUSION
This is not a battle of pro-choice vs. pro-life, or mother vs. fetus.
This is a question of recognizing a viable fetus for what it is, potential
human life. This is something the state has done since Roe v. Wade,
and something that the state must continue to do by prosecuting
women for intentionally trying to kill their viable fetuses.

194.
195.
196.
197.

See Decision, supra note 75, at 10.
See id.
See Resource Guide, supra note 148, at i.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Casey, 112 U.S. at 2819.
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Regardless of the final outcome of State v. Zimmerman, state
legislatures clearly must listen to the Zimmerman court's plea for action.
It is time for state legislators to make decisions about the extent to
which a state should recognize a state's interest in potential human life.
Washington state needs to take the next logical step and pass a law
making a mother's infliction of intentional harm upon her fetus a
crime.

